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Inflationary Consequences of Anticipated Macroeconomic Policies
ABSTRACT
We consider a model in which the le't,el of taxes and seignorage are too
low to finance government expenditures and debt service. Government debt
will therefore grow without bound, implying the eventual need to change
policy. Starting with utility maximization, we analyze the effect of the
expected switch on equilibrium time paths before the switch takes place. We
analyze stabilization via increasing taxes, increasing money growth rates,
or cutting expenditures, both under certainty and under uncertainty about
the composition or timing of a stabilization.
Under full certainty, inflation may rise, fall, or remain constant
before the stabilization, depending on which policy tool is used to
stabilize. Uncertainty solely about the composition of the stabilization
will yield paths in between the above cases, with a price Jump at the time
of stabilization. In general there is no simple correlation between changes
in the budget deficit and inflation. With uncertainty about the timing of a
stabilization, the inflation rate will most likely exhibit fluctuations and
may overshoot its steady state value, even when real balances move
monotonically. Uncertainty about the timing of a stabilization can
therefore itself induce fluctuation in inflation, even if underlying utility
and subjective probability functions are smooth.
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Whathappenswhen the government follows monetary and fiscal policies
which are known to be infeasible, except over the short run? The recognized
unsustainability of the policy means that it is known that at some point in
the future the policy will be abandoned. What is generally not known is
exactly when the regime switch will take place, and the policy mix that will
follow. The eventual infeasibility of the given policy yields not a specific
abandonment date, but only a presumption that the longer the policy has been
in force, the higher the probability that it will be abandoned in thecurrent
period. Though most people would accept the above characterization of the
increasing probability of regime switch, there has been relatively little
work in analyzing the time path of an economy facing a probabilistic
abandonment of an infeasible policy (see, however, Flood and Garber (l984)).
Given the obvious relevance of such a question in, for example, foreign
exchange markets and debt management, such an analysis is highly desirable.
In this paper we analyze this issue by considering a model where for the
existing level of government debt, the government's choice of expendituresg,
a rate of monetary expansion i,andlevel of taxation r are inconsistent
with ever attaining a steady state. Specifically, the level ofseignorage
and regular tax revenues are too low to finance government expenditures and
debt service by themselves. The level of government indebtedness must
therefore be continually increased, and, for unchanged macroeconomic
policies, government debt will grow without bound.-2-
Toanalyze the effects of policy mix and timing uncertainty, our
strategy is as follows. We begin with the full certainty case. We first set
up the individual's maximization problem to derive necessary first-order
conditions. Combined with market equilibrium conditions and the government's
budget constraint, these will yield dynamic equations for debt and real
balances and hence inflation before the regime switch, where the exact path
will depend on the necessary characteristics of the time paths after the
switch. The case of a known switch date but uncertain post-switch policy mix
is a simple extension of the full certainty results.
We then consider the case where the policy mix after the regime switch
is known, but the date of the switch is uncertain. We similarly derive time
paths for bonds, real balances, and inflation, and illustrate these time
paths both via phase diagrams and via computer simulations.
The main results are as follows. Under full certainty, stabilization
via an increase in the rate of monetary growth will imply a monotonically
increasing inflation rate (and a monotonically declining level of real
balances) until the regime switch occurs, while stabilization via increased
non-distortionary taxes will yield a constant level of real balances and
inflation both before and after the switch. Stabilization via budget cuts
implies that inflation must eventually fall, but it could rise or fall prior
to stabilization. Hence, the correlation of inflation and the budget deficit
depends on the public's expectation about the policies that will effect
stabilization.-3-
In the remaining part of the paper we discuss uncertain policies. If
the switch date is known, but the post-switch policy mix is not, real
balances and inflation before the regime switch will follow a path in between
the cases above. The exact nature of the path will depend on the subjective
probability assigned to various combinations of policies used to effect the
stabilization. There will in general be a one-time price jump (which may be
either up or down) at the time of the regime switch.
When there is uncertainty about the timing of the switch, the inflation
rate will most likely exhibit fluctuations and may overshoot its steady state
value, even when real balances move nionotonically. Therefore uncertainty
about the timing of stabilization policy can of itself induce fluctuations in
the inflation rate even if the underlying utility and subjective probability
(of timing or policy mix) functions are smooth. There exist beliefs about
the probability of a policy switch which induce very rapid changes in the
rate of inflation, and there will almost surely be price jumps following a
stabilization effort. Price jumps before a stabilization are also possible
if the distribution of the timing of the policy switch has mass points. The
results on uncertainty strengthen the result that there will be no simple
correlation between changes in the budget deficit on the one hand and in
inflation on the other.
Our interest in possible correlations stems from the recent Israeli
experience with inflation. Recently there has been no simple correlation
between changes in the deficit and inflation. This has been taken by some as
proof that the root cause of the Israeli inflation has not been the-4-
peresistent deficit. By building a model in which it is clear that the
deficit drives inflation, but where no simple correlation emerges, we show
that lack of correlation does not mean lack of causation.
2. Regime Switch at a Known Date
We first consider the case where the exact date of a switch away from an
infeasible policy is known, although the exact nature of the policy change
may not be known. The regime switch at time T can be described as follows.
The level of per capita real bond holding achieved at T, namely b(T), will
be frozen by choice of a new monetary growth rate a new tax rate i
and/ora new level of government spending g5, which imply that government
spending plus debt service can be financed by a constant level of taxes
(inflation and regular) with no further growth in debt. Uncertain policy mix
means that the exact combination of policy changes which will effect the
stabilization is unknown before T. As we shall see below, when there is
uncertainty about the policy mix, stabilization will require a jump in the
price level at T to some post switch level P5(T), and the relevant
uncertainty of the individual is uncertainty about the value of P(T). We
begin by considering the individual's problem.
a. Individual maximization
The individual is assumed to derive utility from consumption and real
money balances, where his instantaneous utility function is assumed separable
across commodities and across time. Utility at instant t may then be
written as-5-
M(t)
(1) u(c(t)) + v(p(t))
where c, M, and P are real consumption, nominal balances, and the price
level. The individual can hold either real money balances or real bonds b
as assets, the real interest rate on the latter being r. He has a discount
rate $andreceives after-tax labor income y per period. We assume that
total output y0 is exogeneously given, so that a fixed level of taxes imply
that after-tax income is fixed as well.
The individual's objective is to maximize expected discounted utility
over an infinite horizon. In the case of full certainty, this is easily
represented. Let vS(.) be the present discounted value of maximized
utility from T onwards. VS will be a function of the real value of an
individual's assets at T, namely b(T) + M(T)/P(T), and perhaps of T as
well. The present discounted welfare from 0 to infinity if a switch occurs
at T is then
(2) $Tet[u(c(t)) + v())dt + eTV5(b(T) + T)
where the characteristics of VS(.) are to be determined.
If we define by z(t) the addition to nominal cash balances at time t,
the individual's choice problem may be thought of as choosing functions-6-
c(t), M(t), and z(t) to maximize (3) subject to two constraints --oneon
income, the other on the relation of M and z -- andto boundary
conditions.
The income constraint is that the present discounted value of income
between 0 and t plus the value of wealth at 0 must equal the discounted
value of expenditures on c and z/P, plus the value of bonds at t
discounted to time zero, plus initial real money balances. This must hold
for all t. For t —Twe obtain
(3) eT)b(T) + Jet)(c(t) + -y)dt+ -w(0)
where wealth w(0) equals initial bonds plus the initial value of nominal
balances evaluated at the initial price level, and where R(t) is the
integral of the interest rate from 0 to t.
The second constraint is that the change in money balances between any




Maximization of (2) subject to constraints (3) and (4) will yield the
individual's optimal time paths under full certainty. In the case of
uncertainty about the policy mix after T, it will turn out (as shown in-7-
section c below) that the individual's relevant uncertainty is about the post
switch price level P5(T). Denoting the distribution of post-switch price








subjectto constraints (3) and (4),l
The mathematical derivation of the solution to the individual's optimum
problem from the first-order conditions is presented in Appendix 1. That
derivation makes clear that the basic dynamic equations for debt and real
balances turn out to be equivalent for the certainty and uncertaintycase,
except for the terminal condition. The results that follow in this and the
next section will therefore apply to both cases.
Consumption may be written c —y0
-g.The marginal utility of
consumption will be denoted by 8 before a stabilization and after.
These values will be constant, but unequal if the stabilization includes a
change in government spending, and hence a change in consumption.
Optimal consumer behavior implies (see the first-order conditions (Al.2)







where the last equation is derived from combinging (Al.3) and (Al.4) in the
Appendix. This is a standard asset pricing equation showing that the value
of one unit of money at time t equals the suni of the discounted earnings
(here, marginal utility) stream plus the discounted resale value.
Equation (6) implies that the instantaneous interest rate is equal to
before the stabilization, but that there might be a jump in the interest
factor at the stabilization date. (It can also be shownthatafter
stabilization the interest is also equal to ).Moreprecisely, from (6)







Thismaybe represented as in Figure 1.
Differentiating (7) with respect to t yields (see the discussion
preceding (Al.9) in the appendix)
(9) v'(m)P 0￿t<T-9-
where the right-hand-side is the real interest rate plus the inflation rate.
A further implication of (7) is that a cut in government expenditure at
time T, even if perfectly foreseen, will induce a jump in the price level.
This may be seen by noting that (7) implies
P(T) R(T)-R(T




sothat g <gimplies a (fully anticipated) downward jump in the price
level due to the upward jump in consumption necessary to clear the output
market.
One may explain this price level jump under perfect foresight, which
comes from the jump in the interest factor, as follows. Because bonds are
denominated in real terms with a fixed price in terms of the consumption
good, the real stock of bonds cannot jump at T (see footnote 3 below). If
bonds were nominal or if we allowed their price relative to consumption to
vary, then the real stock would jump2. Given the fixed real price of bonds,
the interest factor R(T) must jump. The infinite return on one asset at the
instant T requires an infinite return on the other asset, money, implying a
price level jump.- 10-
Theresult of a jump in the price level is robust to a number of
reasonable alternative specifications of the output market. First, suppose
we opened the economy, so that we could import goods from abroad at fixed
terms-of-trade. As long as some part of the cut in government expenditures
fell on nontraded goods, there would still be a jump in the price of
nontraded goods and a jump in the interest rate in terms of nontradables.
The overall price level would therefore also jump (see Drazen and Helpman
(1986)).
A second modification would be to allow investment so that a fixed level
of output does not automatically imply a one-to-one relation between changes
in private and government consumption. As long as there are convex
adjustment costs to investment or disinvestment, utility maximization would
yield a jump in consumption at T.
b. Government behavior and the dynamic equations
We may derive the dynamic equations for b and in by embedding the
equilibrium conditions in the government behavioral equations. The
government budget constraint implies that the basic deficit plus debt service





for0 ￿ t < T, where d is the basic real deficit (d —g
-r)and where
M/P — M/P—pm.At T the interest rate will jump if g is cut.3
Combining this with the definitional relation for the change in real
balances, namely in —(p
-)m,where we assume population growth is equal to
zero, we obtain
(12) m —(fi +p)m -mv'(m).
As indicated above and demonstrated in Appendix 1, the dynamicequations
(11) and (12) describe the motion of the system before a known switch dateT
both for the case of full certainty and for the case ofuncertain post-switch
policy mix. The difference between the two cases concerns the nature of the
terminal condition at T. Before considering the terminalconditions, we can
describe the motion of the system until T. The b —0and m —0loci,
which follow from (11) and (12), may be representedas in Figure 2, with the
implied motion for points off the loci.
The steady state A is a point of unstable equilibrium (asource). For
any values of p, r, and g there is only one value of debt which is
consistent with steady state.If, for given p, r, and g, the values of
debt and real balances are such that we are to the right of the b—0
locus, debt will grow without bound in the absence of a regime switch. We
only consider initial values of debt which are to the right of thesteady
state point described in Figure 2, that is,b0 > b.- 12-
c.The full time paths under certainty
To derive the full time paths starting from a value of b0 that will
induce a policy switch at T, we consider the transversality condition at T.
We first consider the polar cases under certainty, where only one of the
policy instruments is changed at T, the others left unchanged. In each
case, the relevant policy variables must be chosen so that post-switch real
balances and debt are at steady state values.
For each of the policy instruments, the terminal locus (the feasible
combinations of m and bin steady state) may be found by considering
the intersection of the m —0and b —0loci as the value of that
instrument is varied. We first consider money based stabilization. For
increases in p, both loci shift down, the location of the intersection
depending on the elasticity of money demand.4When this elasticity Is
everywhere less than one, this locus will be downward sloping, with the new
intersection at point B. More generally, if seignorage revenues pm reach
a maximum at some finite value of p, say p*, the locus of intersection
points will lie to the southeast of the original point until seignorage
revenue reaches its maximum, after which the locus will slope down to the
southwest. Associated with maximum seignorage is a maximum value of debt,
say b, which can be financed in steady state by the inflation tax, for a
given deficit. Below this maximum a given value of debt is associated with
two values of muand hence p .Wewill assume that for values of debt
S S
below the maximum the government chooses to stabilize at the lower possible
p ,sothat we have a functional relation between muand b .Wedenote
5 5 5- 13-
thisby m(b) where the superscript indicates which policy variable has
been changed to effect the stabilization. This curve is downward sloping
along the relevant section, as in Figure 3•5
The full time path may now be easily derived (more details may be found
in Drazen [1985)). The possibility of stabilization at T for some value of
smeansthat the values of b(T) and M(T)/P(T) must lie on the terminal
surface. Since the value of T is known with certainty beforehand, there
can be no jump in P at T. This may be seen by inspection of equation (7).
Therefore the dynamic path for real balances and debt must just arrive at
at T. The path is uniquely specified given: this terminal
requirement; the dynamic behavior of debt and real balances from time 0 to
T as specified by (11) and (12); and, the initial predetermined value of
real per capita bonds b0. Put another way, there is only one path starting
at b0 at time zero and arriving at m(b) at time T which satisfies the
dynamic equations. Such a path is illustrated in Figure 3 by the falling
arrow path. One notes that along this path debt is rising and real balances
are falling monotonically. By condition (9), inflation must therefore be
monotonically rising from 0 to T. Specifically, inflation is between
and along the path and equals after a stabilization.
It may be shown that the optimal path must cut the m(b) locus from
below if T is sufficiently large. Moreover, if the slope of d(b) is flat
at b0, the dynamic path will start above n(b) and cut it at some
t< T.6The drawing in Figure 3 reflects this possibility.- 14-
Thecase in which non-distortionary taxes r are used to stabilize with
certainty at T may be simply analyzed. Since r does not appear in the
dynamic equation for money balances, changes in r do not shift the m —0
locus when g and p are held fixed. The locus of intersections of the
rn—O and b —0lines for changes in r, denoted mT(b), is then simply the
horizontal in— 0locus, as indicated in Figure 3. As before, there is a
maximum level of debt consistent with tax-based stabilization.
The dynamic path in this case must then always lie on the mT(b) locus
(that is, the in— 0locus) if it is to end up there. This is represented by
the horizontal arrow path in Figure 3. Along this path real balances and
hence inflation will be constant, the latter equal to the unchanged value of
p. A Ricardian equivalence result obtains, since only the timing of
noh-distortionary taxation is affected.
If taxes are distortionary (for example, labor income taxes) the above
result no longer holds. Changes in the tax rate affect the level and
marginal utility of consumption, as in the case of stabilization via
government expenditure cuts. The results are conceptually similar in most
respects to the results for that case and are treated in detail in Drazen and
Helpman (l985c).
For a stabilization via expenditure cuts under certainty, the terminal
surface, denoted (b), is upward sloping, as in Figure 4. A cut in g
shifts the b —0locus down and the m —0locus up so that the new
intersection lies to the north-east.7Hence, real balances unambiguously- 15-
risewith increases in debt. As with stabilization based on changes in money
growth or taxes, there is a maximum feasible level of steady state debt, say
6, which can be supported by a budget cut, as g can drop at most to zero.
The key difference between this and the earlier cases is the behavior of
the price level and the real interest rate at T. With stabilization via
budget cuts there will be a jump in the real interest factor and in the price
level, and hence, in real balances at T.
To derive the dynamic path and see the implications of the jump at T




If we denote by iithevalue of real balances for which zn —0,we have that
— v'(m) v(m) s
9—+— 9




It is clear from (14) that the value of its right-hand-side determines
whether real balances just before the price jump at T are above, on, or- 16-
belowthe horizontal m —0locus. If this value is larger than (equal to,
less than) one, real balances have to be above (on, below) the m —0locus.
Obviously, since m5 depends on the stabilization date T, so does this
value. It is, however, clear from the directions of movement indicated in
Figure 2 that if the economy is above m —0at some time it has to be above
m —0at all times, and similarly for being on or below m —0.Therefore,
there exist three possibilities of economic dynamics according to whether the
right-hand-side of (14) is larger, equal, or smaller than one. In each case,
real balances will jump at I as a result of the downward price jump.
The first possibility is that real balances are rising over time, as
indicated by the upward sloping arrow path in Figure 4, until the switch
takes place at b =b(T)and real balances jump from A1 to B. The rate
of inflation is falling over time (from (9)) and is lower than the rate of
monetary growth (as real balances are rising). After the policy switch, the
rate of inflation equals the rate of monetary growth. Panel (i) of Figure 5
displays the resulting time paths of the price level and the rate of
inflation.
The second possibility is constant real balances over time (the
horizontal path leading to A2) and a jump up to B. The rate of inflation
will be constant, except at T, as in panel (ii) in Figure 5.
Finally, real balances may fall, leading to A3, followed by an upward
jump to B. The rate of inflation is rising before the policy switch, then
drops to a lower level, as in panel (iii) of Figure 5.- 17-
Tosummarize these results, one may note that v'(m)m is increasing in
real balances when the interest elasticity of demand for real balances is
larger than one (in absolute value) and it is declining in real balances when
the interest elasticity of demand for real balances is smaller than one.
(This is immediately seen by using (8) to write the demand for real balances
in implicit form as v'(m) —Oior v'(m) — where i is the nominal
interest rate.) Hence, since m5 >ni,the right-hand-side of (14) is larger
than one for everywhere interest-elastic demand functions for money and
smaller than one for everywhere interest-inelastic demand functions for
money. This implies that the time path of inflation and real balances
depends on whether the interest elasticity of money demand is larger or
smaller than one, but does not depend on the timing of the policy switch.
However, the timing of the policy switch does affect the nature of the
inflationary process when the interest elasticity of money demand is on both
sides of one for real balances above ii. 8
The certainty framework could be used to analyze multistage
stabilization programs, which would imply more complex time paths. For
example, suppose the stabilization is known to entail a cut in government
expenditures at I followed by a reduction in money growth at I' >I,the
two changes together leading to no further growth in debt. This program
(which resembles those often used to end hyperinflations) can be shown to
imply a fall in real balances until I, followed by a rise from I to I',
with inflation moving in the opposite direction. (After I', all variables
are constant). As noted below, this result mimics a characteristic ofhyperinfiatioflarY time path. (Afu11 discussion of this case maybe found
in rázenand Helpnian (1985bY.)
With the three polar cases having been analyzed, knowncombinationsof
and g to finance a given budget at T may be easily analyzed. Any
policy mix rule which determines endogeneous combinationsof the policy tools
consistent with stabilization will determine a terminal locus relating m
to b. When the policy mix is limited to changes in j,r,and g in the
direction of a lower deficit (increases in the first two, decreases in the
last) this locus will lie between the m(b) loci, its precise position
depending on the policy mix (Otherwise, of course, the terminal surface
could lie above m(b) or below m(b)). The dynamic path will then be that
which starts at b0 and, foilowing the dynamic equations (11) and (12), just
hits the terminal surface t T.
d. The time paths under yolicy mix uncertainty
The above analysis of the certainty case makes clear that, from the
point of view of the individual, the relevant differences between alternative
policy mixes at T i￿ in different levels of the post-switch price level
P5(T). Uncertainty about P(T) may be represented by adistribution
C(P(T)), which is induced by a subjective probability distribution over
possible policy mixes, andknówledge of the structure of the economy linking
each policy mix to a value of P(T). The optimum problem is then to
maximize expected discountedütility Over an infinite horizon where T is
knownandwhere G(P5(T)) is usedto form expected utility. This is exactly
the problem set out in equation (5) above and solved in Appendix 1, yielding- 19-
dynamicequations (11) and (12). Therefore, once behavior at T is
specified, the entire path will be known.
After the policy mix is announced at T, we must be on the relevant
terminal surface. Since the chosen mix is unknown before T, it is obvious
that there will be a jump to the relevant surface at T due to a price level
jump.9 The price level before the jump will be determined by an asset
pricing equation, namely (see equation A1.13 in Appendix 1):
(15) —JText)
v'(m(x))
P(x) + eTt)J —dG(P)
As t approaches T, we therefore have that
P(t)
must approach the
expectations of taken over G(P(T)). This ties down the price level
along the optimal path the instant before T, which, in turn, ties down the
whole path. The equilibrium path may then be represented as in Figure 6,
with its exact location at t—Tdependent on how much weight is assigned to
each possible choice of policy mix at T.If, for example, it is considered
highly likely that the main adjustment will come in an increase in the rate
of monetary growth, with the expectation that there will be a relatively
small increase in taxes and cut in expenditures, the path will be relatively
closer to the m1(b) line. At T, when the actual program is announced, we
jump to the relevant terminal surface. To continue the example, if the
actual program includes a smaller increase in p than was expected, so that
the terminal surface is above the optimal path based on the contrary- 20-
expectations,there will be an upward jump in m, or, equivalently, a
downward price level jump. In this case the stabilization program implies an
actual rate of monetary growth lower than was expected, which calls for a
downward price adjustment. If the stabilization included a decrease in p
coupled with a sufficiently large value of r to support it, then the
terminal value of real balances may happen to be larger than rn. More
generally, policy mixes which include a decrease in taxes or the rate of
money growth or increases in government spending imply a post-stabilization
value of real balances outside the region between the terminal surfaces.
3. Uncertainty about the Timing of the Regime Switch
a. The basic structure
The basic structure is the same as above, but we now assume that the
switch may occur at any time between 0 and some Tx where the cumulative
distribution of a switch occurring until T is F(T). Clearly F(0) —0
and F(Tmax) —1.We consider the case where only one switch takes place.
For simplicity, we assune the policy mix is known.
The expectation of discounted utility over the horizon is taken over
dF(T). The individual's present discounted utility if a switch occurs at T
is given by (2). Expected welfare over all possible realizations of T may
then be written- 21
(16)Jmax($et[u(c(t))+ v()]dt + eT VS(b(T) + p(T);TfldF(T)
The individual's problem is therefore to maximize (16) subject to constraints
(3) and (4). The derivation of the first-order conditions for this case
(which are derived in Appendix 2) are
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Differentiating (17) with respect to t yields
e
(19) dR —dt+ -91-F
Inthe case of a (non-distortionary) tax-based or money-based
stabilization, the marginal utility of consumption is equal before and after
a stabilization, so that the real interest rate is constant and equal to
with uncertainty about timing. In the case of a budget cut, the real
interest rate will include a risk premium reflecting the probability of a
jumpinthe marginal utility of consumption. The marginal utility of
consumption after a stabilization, is falling over time, since the
longer that no stabilization has taken place, the higher is the level of debt
at the time of stabilization, the lower must be government post-stabilization- 22-
expenditures,and hence the higher is private consumption. The risk premium
is the product of the instantaneous probability of a regime switch at t
conditional on one not having previously taken place (!F) and the
percentage fall in marginal utility of consumption which the regimeswitch
8-8
induces
85) Since typically both of these terms are rising over time
until a switch occurs, the real interest rate dR will be rising as well.
(The hazard rate may in some circumstances be failing over time).
Differentiating (18) with respect to t and rearranging, we obtain (see
equation (A2.8) in Appendix 2)
v'(m) dP dF s s
(20a) dt —f3dt+ i—+-(i - )
(20b) /3dt + -(l --) ++ lFU -.)
Theright-hand-side is the nominal interest rate, which includes both a
nominal and real risk premium. The second right-hand-side term in (20b) is
the real risk premium associated with jumps in the real interest rate. The
last term is a nominal risk premium reflecting changes in the real value of
money due to a regime switch. It includes three effects: the hazard rate,
the percentage change in the real value of nominal balances from a price jump
1/P -1/P
S), and the change in the utility value of real balances (9/9).
The form of (20) allows for the possibility of a jump in F. It makes clear
that a jump in F induces a jump in P. For example, if is less than
P. a jump in F induces an upward jump in P.- 23-
b.The dynamic eouations for in and b
Equation (20) allows us to derive dynamic equations for debt and real
balances, precisely as in the previous section.When F is differentiable,
we obtain from (11) and (12)
• 9
(21) b —( + h[l-!])b+g
-r -
m(b)9 m - v'(rnF
(22) - — + p- ' + -
in
wherem(b) refers to the relevant terminal surface for the policy chosen.
These equations may be expressed in a time-autonomous form. Note first
that 0 may be written as a function of b since 0 —v'(m(b))/(÷p)
(seefootnote 7). The conditional probability of a switch should logically
also be a function of debt. Since there is a maximum level of debt
consistent with stabilization and since b grows without bound in the
absence of stabilization, one must expect that if no regime switch has
occurred before b hits some b (less than or equal to maximum feasible max
steady state b attained, for example, at g —0),then a regime switch
must occur at that time. More generally, one may argue that the probability
of a regime switch grows as b(t) approaches bmx with a regime switch
occurring with certainty sometime between 0 and the time b(t) hits
b.1° Werepresent this by writing the conditional density of a switch as
a function of b- 24-
(23) —
where'(b) ￿0.The restriction that F(T) —1will imply that
becomes infinite as b approaches bmax unless the distribution has a mass
11 point at Tmax
F'








Equations (24) and (25) form an autonomous system of two equations in m and
b which yield equilibrium time paths for any specification of (.)
satisfyingthe above-noted restrictions. It is the existence of both real
and nominal risk premia which complicate these equations.
c. The time paths for debt and real balances under monetary stabilization
To derive the characteristics of the full-time paths when a regime
switch is effected solely by changing the rate of money growth, we begin by
deriving phase diagrams in rn-b space. Since 6 —9,the dynamic equation
for debt is equivalent to the certainty case, as is the b —0locus. The




Since b enters the dynamic equation for real balances, the in— 0locus is
no longer horizontal and will depend on the sign of m -in alongin— 0.One
can show that the in— 0locus must lie below the in —0locus under
certainty.
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The phase diagram for uncertain T when only p changes with a regime
switch can be represented as in Figure 7. As will be demonstrated below,
equilibrium will require that if we are not already in a steady state, we
must be in the unshaded region to the right of b where b is rising and m
13
is falling.
We may now specify the equilibrium dynamic path. After a stabilization
at some T and associated b(T), we must be on We therefore jump at
T to the value of m5 consistent with b(T) according to the terminal
surface. What is the path before T? As in the previous section, we
consider the terminal condition and work backwards.
Suppose the regime switch occurs only at the last possible moment
(rather than considering this final instant in the time domain, let us
consider it in terms of b and b ).Therecan then be no jump in real max
balances before b .Butif a switch occurs with positive probability at max
b there can also be no jump at b .Intuitivelythis is easy to see. max max- 26-
Ifwe know that with non-zero probability there will be a regime switch at
the last instant (conditional on the switch not having taken place before), a
path which implies a jump at this last instant means that inunediately before
one may expect with certainty an infinite rate of capital gain (or loss) on
money holdings. In such a case, money holdings would adjust before the last
instant to eliminate this possibility. Hence, on a path where the regime
switch occurs at b with non-zero probability, we must approach m(b ) mv mv
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smoothly.
Since the path before a regime switch must arrive smoothly at
(b in(b ))ifa switch occurs only at T ,itis clear from the slope max s max max
of m(b) that starting at any b0 <bmaxdebt must be rising and real
balances must be falling. This is why the initial value of real balances
consistent with initial debt and equilibrium at every point in time must be
in the unshaded region in Figure 7. The exact value of initial balances in0
may be found by starting at bmax and "running the dynamic equations
backwards."
At T ￿T,when the regime switch actually occurs, we jump to the
Tn(b) line, meaning the price level jumps to P(T). The direction of the
jump depends on whether the dynamic path is above or below the m'(b) line
(where we assume as before that b is strictly less than b). If b is max max
sufficiently close to 6,onecan show that for b(t) close to b ,the
max
optimal dynamic path must be below m(b), as in Figure 715 A regime switch
"late in the game" will therefore induce an upward jump in real balances
meaning a downward price jump. On the other hand, if the horizon is- 27-
sufficientlylong, the dynamic path may start above m'(b) and a regime
switch fairly early on will imply an upward jump in P.
d. Fluctuation in inflation and the risk rremium under monetary
stabilization
Monotonically declining real balances until the switch takes place
implies a rising nominal interest rate, which in the case where the date of
the switch is known with certainty, implies a monotonically rising inflation
rate. This result does carry over. Uncertainty about the switch date may
induce fluctuations in the inflation rate even when (•)iswell-behaved and
real balances move nionotonically.
Analytically, such a possibility is easy to see. The first-order
condition equates the ratio of marginal utilities of real balances and
consumption to the nominal interest rate, where under uncertainty the latter
is the sum of the real interest rate, the inflation rate, and a "risk premiun"
4(l -P/P5).The risk premium reflects the possibility that at any instant a
regime change may take place which would induce a price jump and a capital
loss (or gain) on nominal balances. Solving for the inflation rate ,r(t) we




Onenotes that a large negative risk premium implies a large positive rate of
inflation. Therefore, during the pre-switch period the rate of inflation may
happen to be higher than in the post-switch equilibrium. Differentiating (27)
with respect to time we obtain
m . m dnP/db m.mv" .S,.,.. 5.. S
UL)w - +DL- -
m
The term multiplying in/rn is unambiguously negative, so that the first
term is unambiguously positive along the dynamic path, pushing inflation
upwards. The term in the second parentheses and hence the whole second term,
is, however, negative if 4i'(b) >0and m(t) is larger than nP(b(t)), and
ambiguous if it is smaller. Therefore, dir/dt may be of either sign and can
change sign as the relative strength of the various influences changes.
therefore need not be monotonic and may fluctuate. (One may note that the
expected inflation rate inclusive of the expected jump in P is monotonically
rising). Comparison with the case where T is known shows that it is the
uncertainty about the switch date (and the implied risk premium) which is the
source of these fluctuations.
The importance of the risk premium will be especially great as we
approach T when the instantaneous probability of a regime switch
approaches infinity. Here, instantaneous movements in the risk premium will
be the dominant factor in determining movements in the rate of inflation and- 29-
maywell induce "overshooting." Consider the first term in the second
brackets of (28). As b approaches b ,mwill approach UIM(b )(from max 5max
below if b is close to b, given our arguments in section 2c above), so max
that (1 -rn/rn)will approach zero from below. Since '(b) is infinitely
large at b when there is no mass point of F at T ,'(b)will max max
approach infinity as b approaches b. If 'approachesinfinity faster
than (1 -rn/rn)approaches zero, the negative contribution of this term will
dominate the other terms and the inflation rate will fall rapidly as debt
approaches its maximum feasible value. Earlier in the path, when the risk
premium is small, the behavior of irwillbe closer to the case of certainty,
so that inflation will be rising. Therefore, one may anticipate overshooting
if no regime switch has occurred as tapproachesT. This argument does
not, of course, rule out earlier fluctuations in the rate of inflation.
To examine these presumptions about fluctuations in w, we ran numerous
simulations of the model. We considered the utility function specified in
footnote 5 and the function 4(b) —1+lOO(6-b)2which satisfies the
restrictions on 4infootnote 11. For a range of specified values for the
exogenous variable, we indeed found there to be overshooting in as b
approached bm• The results of one simulation may be seen in Table 1 (this
is a sample from several thousand points) which presents the relationship
between debt, real balance, the rate of inflation and the risk premium. The
relationship between debt and the rate of inflation is plotted in Figure 8,
showing a rise in the rate of inflation followed by a rapid fall as debt
approaches its upper limit.- 30-
Itis also of interest to note from equation (20a) (or (A2.5) in Appendix
2) that if the distribution function F(t) is discontinuous, so is the price
function P(t). This implies that if at some point in time people believe
that there is a probability mass of a switch taking place, this will result in
a price jump independently of whether the switch does in effect take place.
If real balances are above m'(b), that is, if the risk premium is positive,
there is a downward price jump just before it becomes known whether a policy
switch takes place. If it does not take place the price level changes
continuously, and if it does take place, the price level jumps upwards. Jumps
in opposite directions result at times at which the risk premium is negative.
A situation such as this may arise if there is a threshold debt level (or
a point in time) at which a switch is most likely to occur. This describes,
therefore, a realistic possibility. Since a discontinuity in the distribution
function can be approximated by a very fast increase in F(t), this shows also
that in the presence of uncertainty about marcoeconomic policies there can be
rapid changes in the rate of inflation. For example, suppose the distribution
function rises very quickly over a very short time interval and flattens out
subsequently. If the risk premium is positive during this time interval,
inflation will rapidly decline initially and rapidly increase subsequently,
but if it is negative, inflation will rapidly increase initially and rapidly
decline subsequently, provided that no policy change has taken place.
Our analysis has a bearing on the issue of tight money and inflation that
was raised by Sargent and Wallace (1981). They consider an economy initially
in steady state with a constant rate of inflation and money growth in whichthoewu U te4&yeQ4Xfrwthuchaig
taxes or expenditure. This induces a growth in debt which is stopped
whenthe rate of monetary growth is raised to the necessary level. They ask
what are the inflationary consequences of a currettightening of monetary
growth, given the anticipation of an eventual inevitable increase in the money
growth rate. As Drazen (1985) has shown in an environment of the type
considered in this paper, the temporary tightening of money growth can bring
about an initial increase or reduction in the rate f latinL,
thereafter the rate of inflation will rise over time until it reaches its new
higher steady state level. There may, but need not be, short-run decreases in
the rate of inflation. It is in fact posill&tthe t1ht mhoHy to
bring about higher information at all times. In that analysis the date at
which debt is stopped from grdwiiig Is known with certainty
Our analysis implies that in the presence of uncertainty abcut the date
in which debt growth will be stopped, a tight money policy can generate
temporarily very high inflation rates, with the rate of inflation declining
over time as long as debt is not prevented from growing (see the last part of
the graph in Figure 8). This is more likely the larger the initial debt level
and tEe larger the ins tantaneous conditional probability of apfiye
that is, the less confidëncethere is in thetight money policy.
:jJhw via a the4yai4c
equations are of the general form of (24) and (25) with m(b) set equal to- 32fF
mC). To derie phase d-fatants,tbeuattotfkthe b O Io.i- inay1*L
writcefl
(29) fib +(b)(l - )b+g
-r—pm
Assuming that 4,() is rising in b the second left-hand-side term is
-
unambiguouslyincreasing in b. Hence, the b —0locus is upward sloping
with a slope greater than in the certainty case. b is rising to the right of






As steady state b rises, 9falls and inrises.The derivative of the
S 5 --
right-hand-sideof (30) is therefore ambiguous with respect to b. Therefore
the in—0locus may either rise or fall in rn-b space and in fact need not
be sinle-signed. Real balances will befalling below the locus, rising above
it. The locus will lie below (b), since along (b) the probability #
of a regime switch is zero, so that,s->.O
be nted a'1n tti9 where iishowtipossiblef- EO.- 33-
Wemay now derive the dynamic path. The ambiguity about the possible
slope of the in— 0locus (discussed in the previous paragraph) combined with
the jump in real balances at Tinax (due to a jump in the marginal utility of
consumption and hence the price level at this point) will lead to a variety of
possible paths. Specifically, at T we have (see equation (A2.7) in
Appendix 2)
P(T )(b )






in smax $max max
where in denotes the pre-switch level of real balances at T max max
(analogous to m(T) in the certainty case). Since 9 >Os(bmax)(as
government spending is lower and therefore consumption higher after a
stabilization), in must lie below ). max s max
The key to the behavior of the dynamic path is the location of in
max
relative to in— 0locus. If inliesabove this locus, the dynamic path
will be rising as we approach T; if it lies below, it will be falling.
As demonstrated in Appendix 3, where possible paths are discussed in detail,
the location of in relativeto the in —0locus depends on whether it is max
greater or lesser than ,thevalue of real balances for which in— 0in the
certainty case (see the discussion preceding equation (14)). in will lie
below the in— 0locus under uncertainty when inisless than iandwill max
lie above when it is greater.- 34
The other crucial characteristic is whether the dynamic path crosses the
m —0locus. If it does, real balances will not move monotonically along the
path. If it does not cross, they will. (Debt is monotonically rising along
every path).Of course, whether or not the dynamic path crosses the ni —0
locus depends on the characteristics of that locus. Leaving a more detailed
discussion of the paths to be presented in Appendix 3, the two possibilities
about the location of m and the two possibilities about crossing m —0
max
yield four general types of paths for real balances: they may rise
nionotonically; they may rise near Tmax falling or oscillating beforehand;
they may fall monotonically; arid, they may fall near Tmax rising or
oscillating beforehand. The conditions for each case are summarized in Table
2, and the cases are illustrated in the four panels of Figure 10. One should,
of course, remember that these are paths only until a stabilization takes
place. When a stabilization takes place at some tbeforeT ,thevalue of max
real balances jumps to (b()), due to a price level jump.
The behavior of inflation along any path depends not only on the behavior
of real balances, but also on the existence of the risk premia, which reflect
the possibility that at any instant a regime change may take place which would
induce a jump in both the price level and the real interest rate. The
first-order condition (20) equates the ratio of marginal utilities of real
balances and consumption to the nominal interest rate, which reflects risk
premia which may fluctuate. Solving for the inflation rate, we obtain (where
F() is differentiable):- 35-
9(b(t))









Differentiating with respect to time we obtain
o
(33)
9 dO /db 0drn/db + b[-'(l -1)+ + S
The term multiplying rn/rnis unambiguously negative, so that thefirst term
isunambiguously positive along the dynamic path, when real balances are
falling, negative if they are rising. The term in the second brackets is of
ambiguous sign, so that dir/dt may be of either sign and can change sign.
Therefore,inflation and real balancesneed not move in opposite directions.
InDrazen and Helpman (1985b) we present an examplethat replicates the
timepath shown in panel b of Figure 10. This may be of especial interest in
connection with the European hyperinflations of the 1920's, which were ended
by fiscal reforms including sharp cuts in government expenditures whose timing- 36-
wasuncertain ex-ante. In a number of cases the sharp drop in real balances
which characterize hyperinflations was reversed before the fiscal reforms
which led to a lower rate of growth of money were enacted. (Austria and
Hungary provide two examples). We think it useful to show that such behavior
can arise in this sort of model, in particular in view of the fact that in
that example it was assumed that the instantaneous probability of a switch to
constant, so that this variable is not the main driving force behind the
result. This lengthy example is not presented here in order to save space.
g. Dynamic Behavior under tax stabilization
When stabilization is effected via a change in non-distortionary taxes,
the dynamic equations are identical to the case of money-based stabilization.
Since the dynamic pathliust intersect m(b) at Tmax which is identical to
the m —0locus under certainty, the path must always be on this locus. The
dynamic equations and results therefore turn out to be identical to the
certainty case.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to consider situations where current
macroeconomic policies are known to be infeasible, implying an eventual regime- 37-
switch,but where the exact timing or nature of this switch is unknown. Our
goal was to consider the effects of this uncertainty on macroeconomic
variables.
We found that under full certainty, stabilization via an increase in the
money growth rate implies a monotonically increasing inflation rate before a
regime switch occurs, while tax-based stabilization induces a constant
inflation rate, everywhere lower than in the previous case. Stabilization via
budget cuts induces a jump in the price level and a "blip" in the real
interest rate at the date of stabilization. This occurs because the upward
jump in private consumption means that the price level and the real interest
rate must jump to ensure market clearing at every point in time. Real
balances may rise, stay constant, or fall before a stabilization, with
inflation moving in the opposite direction. Tinder uncertainty only about the
policy mix, there will be a one-time price jump when the switch occurs whose
sign and magnitude depend on the actual policy mix adopted relative to what
was expected.
In contrast to these results, when it is known with certainty that the
regime switch will entail an increase in the rate of monetary growth, but the
timing of the switch is uncertain, not only will there be a jump in the price
level at the actual switch date, but fluctuations in the rate of inflation may
also result. Therefore, uncertainty about the timing of an inevitable policy
change may of itself induce fluctuations in the inflation rate. Furthermore,
when budget Cuts whose timing is uncertain are used to stabilize, the real
balances may rise nionotonically, fall monotonically, or may oscillate. The
rate of inflation may similarly exhibit a wide range of paths.- 38-
Afurther characteristic of the time paths which emerges is the lack of
any necessary contemporaneous correlation between budget deficits and the rate
of monetary growth on the one hand and the rate of inflation on the other.
Depending on the expected policy mix which effects the regime switch, a rising
deficit (inclusive of debt service) may induce a rising, constant, or falling
inflation rate. With uncertainty about the timing of a policy change, a
constant rate of money growth and a constant deficit (exclusive of debt
service) may be associated with a fluctuating inflation rate. This lack of
correlation arises even though it is clear that the budget deficit is the
ultimate cause of inflation.APPENDIX I -KNOWNSWITCH DATES
In this appendix we derive the first-order conditions when the switch
date is known. These are necessary and sufficient conditions. The problem
of maximizing present discounted utility (2) subject to constraints (3) and
(4) may be written
I\ Mv I \lAs-
(c(t),z(t) ,M(t) }J0
(A.1.l) + eTV5[eT)w(O) -eT)JTeR(t)(c(t) +
-y)dt
M(O) ÷ 1Tzd rt
+
P (T) + J7(t)[M(O)+ Jz(x)dx-M(t)}dt
S 0 0
wherey(t) is the multiplier on constraint (4)) in the text. Maximization
of (Al.1) with respect to each of the c(t), z(t) and M(t) yields,
respectively, (where V5 is the derivative of VS(.) with respect to
wealth which equals u'(y0-g)):
(Al.2) etu1(y0g) —eTu1(y0g5)eTt)




Condition (Al.2) implies that (using R(O) —0)
forOt<T dtforO￿t<T
(Al.5) R(t) — dR(t)—
u'(y0-g) u'(y0-g)
T+1n , fort —T dt+ln , for
u (y0g5) u (y0-g)
t—T
The conditions (Al.3) through (Al.5) also imply
(Al.6) Pt) -
$Te
t)v'x))P(x) + eTtflpT), 0 ￿ t < T
where 0 —u'(y0
-g).Thisis a standard asset pricing equation. (Al.6)










APPENDIX 2 -UNCERTAINDATE OF A REGIME SWITCH
In this appendix we derive the first-order conditions when the date T
of a switch is unknown.When the cumulative distribution of a switch
occurring until Tis F(T), the individual maximizes (16) in the text,
subject to (3) and (4). The choice problem may be written
maxJTJTT + v()Jdt
{c(t),z(t),M(t)} 0 0






P (T) + Jy(t)[M(O)+ Jz(x)dx
-M(t)}dt}dF(T)
S 0 0
where y(t) is the multiplier on the constraint (4)in the text.
Maximization of (A2.l) with respect to each of the c(t), z(t), and M(t)
yields, respectively, where e —u'(y0-g)is the derivative of
with respect to wealth and where e —u'(y0-g),- A.4-
(A2.2) [1 -F(t)]et9—
jT














Differentiating(A2.2) with respect to t we obtain
8dF
(A2.5) —fidt+(1-
Wemay rewrite (A2.3) as
T1 rmax TT
(A2.6)et) P(T) J0 (T)e!T)
fiT I maxl -fixv'(m(x))ddF(T)÷ dF(T)—I le t $ P(x)
T 9(T)
I max -fit$
dF(T) +1 eP(T) Jt s
-fite
where by (A2.2) the left-hand-side of (A2.6) is simply [1F(tfl9p(t)Upon
substitution of the expression on the left-hand-side of (A2.6) we obtain the







P(T ) max s max
Differentiating (A2.6) with respect to t (after the substitution of
(A2.2)) we obtain
____ et et dP
-fl(l-F)9,dt-(l-F)9,i—
— - (lF)etv(m)dt-etdF
which, upon rearranging becomes
9/P
(A2.8) v(m)d —P + ÷lFG -SS)
APPENDIX3: POSSIBLE DYNAMIC PATHS UNDER UNCERTAINTY
In this appendix we consider in detail possible dynamic paths under
uncertainty about the timing of the regime switch.We will derive four
general types of paths which may obtain if no switch occurs before Tmax•
Two sets of characteristics are key:first, whether the value of real
balances at T prior to a switch, denoted in,liesabove or below the
max max
in—0locus; second, whether the dynamic path crosses the in—0locus.- A.6-
Onthe first, if we denote by in the value of real balances when iii—
0 in the certainty case, inwilllie below the in—0locus under
max
uncertainty when in is less than in,andwill lie above it when it is
max
greater.This follows from noting that sincev(in)—+pwe have (using
(31) in the text) that
v'(m )







0as in in < max<
Whether or not the dynamic path crosses the in —0locus will clearly
depend on the slope of the locus and the relative position of in •Ifthe max
locus is inonotonically upward sloping, the dynamic path cannot cross if
inliesabove the locus. This follows from noting that the dynamic path
max
must end up above the in—0locus, which will be true when the locus is
always rising only if it is everywhere above the locus. In this case the
dynamic path itself is nionotonically rising (Figure lOa). One may note that
even if the locus is downward sloping, the dynamic path may still be
everywhere rising, though a negatively sloped in
—0combined with in >
iisnot sufficient for a rising dynamic path as was true in the first
case.- A.7-
Analogously,if in lies below the in —0locus (in < in), the max max
dynamic path must be monotonically falling if in —0is monotonically
falling (Figure lOc). When 'umax < rn, a positively sloped in —0 locus
can, but need not yield a monotonically falling dynamic path.
In other cases, especially those where the in —0locus itself changes
sign, the dynamic path may change sign, or equivalently, the dynamic path
will cross the in —0locus. For example, when in lies above the max
in —0locus, a path along which real balances first fall and then rise is
consistent either with in —0first rising and then falling, or with the
locus everywbere falling (Figure lOb). When in lies below thein —0
locus, real balances first rising and then falling is consistent with in —0
first falling and then rising, or with it rising throughout (Figure lOd).
If the dynamic path crosses the in —0locus more than once, real
balances will oscillate, the number of sign changes obviously being equal to
the number of crossings. Multiple crossings may occur even when the slope
of the in —0locus change sign only once.
All of these possibilities are summarized in Table 2.FOOTNOTES
1.We assume that the distribution of expected policy mixes does not
change with the passage of time, so that G(P(T)) is time autonomous.
We consider below the effects of changing this assumption.
2.The stock of real debt could jump as the result of an open-market
operation,a policytool we exclude from consideration here.
Open-market operations are considered in Drazen and 1-lelpman (1985c).
3.The government budget constraint shows that although b is not
continuous, b will be for the case of a stabilization via an
expenditure cut. This may be seen by writing the budget constraint in
integral form
b(t) —b0+Je'(g(t)





4.The mathematical expression for the terminal surface may be derivedby
combining the in —0locus with the b —0 locus (the government




Diagramatically, when the elasticity of money demand is less than one,
an increase in pshiftsthe in— 0locus downward less than the b —
olocus so that the new intersection is to the southeast of the
original intersection.





the money demand function isin —e0
+
P/P),so that inflation tax
revenue reaches a maximum at P/P —1/9. Maximum sustainable bond
- 1-(l+fiO)d holdings are b — e
6.Adding (11) and (12) together, one notes that the locus in+ b—0is
identical to the ri?(b) locus in footnote 4, so that total assets are
rising above the inM(b) locus, falling below it, and locally constant- F.3-
onthe curve. Since the absolute value of the slope of the path
relative to unity depends on whether m +bis rising or falling, the
slope of the path will be less than, equal to, or greaterthan one in
absolute value depending on whether we are above, on, or belowm'(b),
whose slope approaches infinity as b approaches6. The optimal path
must therefore cut this curve from below if T is sufficiently large,
and will be above n?(b) if it is flat.
7.Algebraically, we may derive the equation for theterminal surface as










which yields an upward sloping m(b) curve.
8. This point is treated more fully in Drazen and Helpman (1985b).
9.The jumpinthe price level will reflect not only the "arrival of new
information" about the actual stabilization program, but also any
change in c and 9 if the stabilization includes a budget cut.- F.4-
10.The previous section indicated that the maximum level of debt under
each policy mix is fixed by the underlying behavioral relations. It is
therefore independent of F(t). The time it takes for debt to hit this
maximum will, however, depend on F(t) under uncertainty about timing.
T therefore depends on F(t) via the behavioral relations, though
the individual takes T as given in his optimization problem. max





where we have used the boundary condition F(0) —0.The other
T
boundary condition, F(T) —1,obviously implies that J max(b(X))dX
0
—+,unlessthe distribution has a mass point at t—T . Using max
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a sufficient condition for
J#(b(t))dt to approach +ast
Jo
approaches is that #(b)db approaches + as b
approaches b .Thiscan also be shown to be a necessary condition. max
12. It turns out that all we need to know about the in—0locus is its
position relative to the InM(b) locus and the b —0locus. On the
first, note that along mIL(b), the final term in (26) vanishes, so that
the movement of real balances is identical to the certainty case.
Since ni(b) lies below the in —0 locus under certainty, we
therefore know that on in(b), in< 0(and b >0to the right of b
in Figure 7), for any (•)function.Therefore, the in(b) curve must
lie below the in—0curve when T is uncertain. Since inis
therefore greater than m(b) along in—0, (b)(m-m) is
unambiguously positive and the in—0curve is downward sloping when
is increasing in b. In this case it must also lie below the b —0
curve.
13. We have drawnthe in—0locus as horizontal to the left of the b —0
locus, since whenb is falling, there is no inevitability of
stabilization, implying that (b) —0and a —0is horizontal.- F.6-
14.Technically, the impossibility of a jump at Tmaxmay be seen by
examining the individual's first-order conditions (A2.3) and (A2.4) in
Appendix 2 as t approaches Tmax• From the definition of7(t) in
(A2.4) we see that the second integral in (A2.3) must be zero at
t —T .Thismeans that as long as dF(T )isnon-zero, the term
max max
in brackets in the first integral must be zero at T, so that
P_(T) is equal to P(T_J. That is, there is no price jump. -
15.This may be seen by noting first that for bmax strictly less than 6,
(b) will be finite at b from our earlier assumptions. Since the
dynamic path must intersect m(b)at b, meaning in -in
approacheszero, the equations for the dynamic path and m(b)
approach those of the certainty case, so the slope of the dynamic path
approaches one at b .Forb close to 6,theslope of n?(b) max max s
at bmax approaches infinity, so the dynamic path must cut from below.
16. One may note that if the utility function is log-linear in real
balances, the results are identical to the certainty case. This arises
because if the dynamic path ever crosses the m'(b) locus, it must
remain on this locus. The dynamic path must therefore a1ays be n
this locus. This case is discussed in Drazen and Helpman (l985a). See
also Liviatan (1984) and Drazen (1985).REFERENCES
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v'(m) — , — 1+100(6-b)'2
O m1
8—1,fl—.5,-y—.5,g-r—lO











21.885 30.415 .8018 -.1116
22.002 30.227 .8170 -.1206
22.244 29.983 .8516 -.1418
22.370 29.612 •.8719 -.1549
22.500 29.385 .8946 -.1699
22.633 29.147 .9202 -.1874
22.771 28.895 .9490 -.2074
22.912 28.627 .9823 -.2315
23.207'
28.034 1.0677 -.2960
23.351 27.702 1.1232 -.3395
23.362 27.738 1.1794 -.38i0
23.701 26.928 1.1751 -.3629
23.753 26.823 1.0393 -.2233
23.788 26.776 .8177 0TABLE 2
POSSIBLEDYNAMICPATHS
2.This is consistent with the
or falling throughout.
3.This is consistent with the
or rising throughout.
Path does not cross Path crosses








Real balancesrisemonotonicallyReal balances fall,
(FIgure lOa) then rise2, or,
oscillate and then
rise (Figure lOb)
Real balancesfallinonotonica].ly Real balances rise,
(Figure lOc) and then fall3, or,
oscillate and then
fall (Figure lOd)
1.This is consistent with the
negatively sloped.
in — 0being either positively or
in— 0locus rising and then falling,
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